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INTRODUCTION
How insulting to have juxtaposed "lawyers" and "gangsters" in
the title, to hint that lawyers are not engaged in a supremely noble
profession, to insinuate a commonality between counselors-at-law and
godfathers. There will be no explicit comparisons here, for this is an
Essay about Japanese legal education, not La Cosa Nostra. Instead I
offer a description of how Japan trains its lawyers and what lawyers
in Japan do. I'll also talk a bit about how gangsters in Japan are
trained, and what they do. Perhaps a serendipitous connection will
present itself.
I begin by briefly discussing the old system of training
Japanese lawyers and some of the forces that led to the breakdown of
that system. I then detail and analyze the new system, much of which
was borrowed from the United States after careful investigation.
Finally, I offer a few words about Japanese gangsters, the yakuza. It's
not impossible that the story suggests similarities between lawyers
and their illegal counterparts.
I. OLD SCHOOL
Historically, all budding lawyers, judges, and prosecutors in
Japan followed the same career path. Law was exclusively an
Nippon Life Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. I thank the
conference participants and Curtis Milhaupt for their helpful comments.
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undergraduate degree in Japan, and most students who wanted to
enter the legal profession majored in law. Many students sat for the
national bar examination in their third year of university, but only the
best and brightest passed at that stage. Pass rates were kept
extraordinarily low, averaging about two percent annually. Only about
five hundred students per year passed as late as 1990, and in the
2000s, the number rose to only about one thousand.1 Bar-passers were
eligible to enter the Legal Training and Research Institute ("LTRI"),
historically Japan's only school for producing lawyers.
For a country with half the population of the United States, a
rate of one thousand new lawyers per year is quite low. Several factors
explain why Japan historically has had few lawyers. Perhaps the
simplest explanation is the physical structure of the LTRI: officials
argued for years that no more than five hundred bodies could be
squeezed into its halls. At the same time, it is clear that the bar had
reason to limit its numbers: In addition to the fear that admitting
more students would necessarily mean lower standards, lawyers
feared competition from a growing pool. As Japanese litigation rates
remained low and lawyer-substitutes (with undergraduate degrees in
law but not licenses) did some of the work that traditionally had been
the domain of lawyers in Japan, there was little public clamor for
more attorneys.
The LTRI produced prosecutors, judges, and predominantly one
kind of lawyer: general-practice litigators. Lawyers had a monopoly on
courtroom practice--but their monopoly consisted of nothing more
than control of the courtroom, enabling those lawyer-substitutes to
elbow in on other potential action. Transactional lawyers of the sort
seen in the United States were rare and the market for their services
was small; the bureaucracy had little need for lawyers, and for better
or worse, there was no market or role for a Japanese Ralph Nader,
Greta von Susteren, or Ann Coulter.
The situation began to change in the 1980s and 1990s.
Litigation rates rose. Contracts became ubiquitous. Business
organizations pressed the organized bar to produce more lawyers,
specifically more lawyers with transactional and negotiating skills. 2
The universities, the places where lawyers received their initial
training before entering the LTRI, had little to say in the process.
University educators were law professors, scholars of the law; they
were not practicing lawyers and never had been. Nor would their
1. See CURTIS J. MILHAUPT & MARK D. WEST, ECONOMICS ORGANIZATIONS AND CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE IN JAPAN: THE IMPACT OF FORMAL AND INFORMAL RULES 212 (2004).
2. See id. at 207-40; Curtis J. Milhaupt & Mark D. West, Law's Dominion and the Market
for Legal Elites in Japan, 34 LAW & POLY INT'L BUS. 451, 490 (2003).
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students become lawyers: roughly three-quarters of bar-passers
graduated from one of ten elite schools, and many undergraduate law
departments never graduated a single lawyer. The less elite schools
gave students a general education in the law and prodded many into
teaching, but in many cases these schools did not provide the kind of
education that students really sought: bar preparation.
A large and profitable industry arose in Japan to fill the gap:
cram schools. At these bar preparation schools, students learned
exactly what they needed to know for the bar-nothing less, and
certainly nothing more. Many students, and in many cases the best
and the brightest students, skipped their university classes entirely to
devote their studies to bar study at the cram schools. The universities
complained little, as tuition dollars remained steady and professors,
for the most part, understood why students concentrated on studying
for the bar (also, five-hundred-person, lecture-based classes sometimes
made it difficult to notice the absence of particular students).
Professor Setsuo Miyazawa describes his encounter with recent
Japanese bar exam passers:
I asked them which professors they liked most. They could not answer; they had spent
most of their time in cram schools. Some of them asked me to recommend English-
language books on Japanese law. I told them that their universities have excellent
libraries, but they did not know how to find books. Such was the caliber of people, some
of whom had been praised by the media as the brightest stars to lead Japan into the
twenty-first century.
3
A division of labor thus existed in which students gained a
general education from the universities and a bar-specific knowledge
of the law from the cram schools. The LTRI's job was to follow up by
teaching practical skills. Practitioners with real-world lawyering
experience taught classes, students were prodded to think and not
merely memorize the law, and budding lawyers received more
specialized training during the mandatory clerkships that followed
their LTRI classroom education. But again, this education focused on
one specific aspect of legal practice: litigation. The numbers of lawyers
that were being produced simply were not sufficient to meet the
growing societal demand, either in litigation or in the other areas in
which American lawyers routinely practice.
In the late 1990s, interest group politics began to coalesce
around a solution that would involve-somehow-increasing the size
of the bar. Businesses were begging for more lawyers; the business
roundtable Federation of Economic Organizations even proposed
3. Setsuo Miyazawa, The Politics of Judicial Reform in Japan: The Rule of Law at Last?, 2




graduate law schools.4 A political shift in the Japan Federation of Bar
Associations occurred as younger activist lawyers successfully pushed
an expansionist agenda past the old guard. Universities began to eye
jealously the revenue that the cram schools were earning. Consumer
groups complained of high legal fees and the scarcity of lawyers in the
countryside. As the clamor rose, political institutions-among them
the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Justice, and the Cabinet-
began to seek political gains from change.
II. NEW SCHOOL
In 1999, under the direction of Prime Minister Junichiro
Koizumi, the Justice System Reform Council was created. The Council
was charged with several mandates for improving the legal system;
among them were imperatives for major changes in both the method of
legal education and the number of lawyers produced. With respect to
the number of lawyers produced, the Council set a goal of tripling the
annual number of bar exam passers, reaching three thousand per year
by 2010. The number was arbitrary, of course, but it was a target that
would bring the country closer to what was seen as a "world standard"
in per capita attorneys.
Others have written extensively about the political struggles
and the details of the Council workings. 5 Here, I am more interested
in the result, for the result was at least potentially monumental. The
Council was presented with many potential models, including small
modifications of the current system to simply combine the fourth year
of undergraduate studies with a two-year graduate program, 6
wholesale changes based on legal education in other civil law systems,
and relative inaction. Ultimately, the Council eschewed these options,
and in its June 2001 Final Report, it chose a model that resembled
American law schools.7 The Council quickly discouraged official use of
the word "law school" (ro- suku-ru) and instead opted for the more
4. See id. at 111.
5. See, e.g., Daniel H. Foote, Forces Driving and Shaping Legal Training Reform in Japan,
7 AUSTRALIAN J. ASIAN L. 215, 215-28 (2005); Tom Ginsburg, Transforming Legal Education in
Japan and Korea, 22 PENN. ST. INT'L L. REV. 433, 437-38 (2004); Yoshiharu Kawabata, The
Reform of Legal Education and Training in Japan: Problems and Prospects, 43 S. TEX. L. REV.
419, 420-25 (2002); Setsuo Miyazawa, Education and Training of Lawyers in Japan-A Critical
Analysis, 43 S. TEX. L. REV. 491, 494-95 (2002); Miyazawa, supra note 3, at 106-10.
6. See Shigeaki Tanaka, H6s5 Yosei Seido Kaikaku to Daigaku no H6gaku Kyoiku [Legal
Education Reform and University Legal Education], 1 KYOTO DAIGAKU HOGAKUBU
HYAKUSHUNEN KINEN RONBUNSHU 53 (1999).
7. JUSTICE SYSTEM REFORM COUNCIL, RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE JUSTICE SYSTEM
REFORM COUNCIL: FOR A JUSTICE SYSTEM TO SUPPORT JAPAN IN THE 21ST CENTURY, available at
http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/judiciary/2001/0612report.html.
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native-sounding Japanese version: hOka daigakuin, which translates
to "graduate law schools."8  But the American flavor was
unmistakable.
In April 2004, sixty-eight new law schools opened their doors to
5770 newly admitted graduate students. The preexisting
undergraduate system was left intact. The new law school system
offers two basic options to a person who wants to become a lawyer.
Under the first option, she can major in law as an undergraduate. She
then passes a test for law school admission (aided, perhaps, by the
cram schools), goes to law school for three years, and takes a newly
created bar exam. If she passes, she enters the LTRI training program
for eighteen months: six months in LTRI classrooms (three months at
the beginning and three months at the end), and twelve months in the
field. She then becomes a lawyer, judge, or prosecutor.
Under the second option, she can major as an undergraduate in
a subject other than law, such as economics, literature, or music. She
can even embark on a separate career before law school, which would
have been virtually unthinkable in the past. She then takes a
test-the same test taken by the law undergraduates-for law school
admissions. A stated governmental goal is to conduct the admissions
such that approximately thirty percent of each class is made up of
people who are not undergraduate students at the time they apply,
creating an affirmative action program for working people. 9 If
accepted, a candidate enters the graduate law school, and unlike her
law school undergraduate compatriots, she stays there for three years,
rather than two.
In both the two- and three-year models, the remainder of the
path after law school is identical to that of pre-reform system. But in a
paternalistic move toward quality control, the new system limits the
number of times that a graduate can take the bar examination,
allowing only three attempts within five years of graduation (the exam
is offered annually).
By expanding their reach into two to three more years of legal
education, some universities and other educational institutions saw
potential financial gains. As Japan's population slumped, so too had
university enrollment, and law schools were just one more creative
way for universities to continue to generate revenue. When it came
time for the Ministry of Education (which knew little about educating
lawyers) to accredit law schools, the Ministry looked to see if the bare
minimum of numerical requirements was met (such as a set
8. See Dan Rosen, Schooling Lawyers, 2 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL'Y J. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 66, 70
(2001).
9. Kawabata, supra note 5, at 434.
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percentage of practitioners on the faculty) and accredited virtually all
applying schools, creating in an instant roughly the same law-school-
per-capita relation as that which exists in the United States.
Was this the right answer? That's hard to say. From the
American perspective, a few criticisms can easily be raised:
1. Length of education. We like to think that we have got it
right in America: Legal education takes three years, no less, no more.
Of course, most of us know that it really doesn't take three years. Just
as a property course can be taught in the first-year curriculum in
three hours or five, so too could law school end in two years or drag on
for four. But a potential six years of legal education under the
Japanese model, even if the goals of undergraduate education (to give
students general legal knowledge) and graduate education (to make
lawyers) differ substantially, seems like a long time to tie up a
productive member of society.'0 One of the goals of the reform was to
eliminate the dead-weight of the serial bar-takers who worked at
convenience stores for years while they repeatedly failed the bar;
however, keeping the best and brightest in school for six years creates
a similar conundrum.
The mixing of students who require only two years of post-
graduate legal education and those who require three presents a more
difficult pedagogical problem. Professors in Japan are struggling with
the task of teaching both students who have four years of legal
education as an undergraduate and those who have none in the same
classroom. Further complicating the picture is student strategy: Many
law undergraduates, who should only require two years of study, are
opting for the three-year course because they are not confident that
they can pass the bar in three tries otherwise. The classroom, then, is
often a mix of relative experts and complete beginners.
2. Undergraduate law schools. In Japan, the ninety
undergraduate law departments collectively enroll over 45,000 new
students per year (180,000 in a four-year program)," a number
roughly equal to the number of students taught in U.S. law schools. In
other words, Japan has twice the number of law students per capita as
does the United States. 12 Undergraduate law programs would clash
with graduate legal education in America. But of course, we in
America didn't face the decision explicitly as Japan did; our
institutions simply evolved into what they are now. Perhaps there will
10. Because many undergraduate law programs require one and one-half years of liberal
arts classes, the six-year period is likely to be closer to four and one-half years for many law
undergraduates.
11. See Foote, supra note 5, at 216; Kawabata, supra note 5, at 431.
12. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, 2004 ENROLLMENT STATISTICS, available at
http://www.abanet.orgflegaled/statistics/fall2004enrollment.pdf.
[Vol. 60:2:439444
MAKING LAWYERS (AND GANGSTERS)
remain a market in Japan for general legal education at the
undergraduate level-and in any event keeping it helped create the
political consensus necessary to change the system.
3. Faculty. Who should teach? Ideally, we would like scholar-
practitioners to teach lawyers, but such persons are few and far
between. Given the salaries that universities in Japan are paying, the
trend seems likely to continue. So for now, many Japanese law schools
employ many adjuncts and other pseudo-faculty positions to attempt
to take advantage of practitioners' expertise.
4. Failures. What's going to happen under the new system to
students who fail the bar? Under the old system, those who failed had
lost opportunity costs and lost cram school dollars, but not tuition to
government-accredited universities. Despite handing out thousands of
degrees in law, many undergraduate institutions in Japan never
graduated a student who passed the bar. Under the new system,
graduate law schools will have no such luxury. The plan to allow three
thousand students per year to be admitted to the newly reconstituted
LTRI by 2010 leaves over half of law school graduates without an
immediate career. That number is far less than the seventy to eighty
percent pass rates that reformers suggested as a goal for the schools.
We currently have only one year of new bar exam data. In
2006, 2087 students took the first bar exam administered under the
new system. These test-takers were graduates of the two-year course
who had majored in law as undergraduates. Of this group, 1009 were
allowed to pass, leaving over one thousand students without jobs. 13
Presumably they will retake the exam in 2007, when they will face the
daunting task of competing not only with each other, but also with the
two-year and three-year graduates of the class of 2007. If they fail a
second time, they will be allowed to take the test only once more.
5. Pedagogy. How should law students be taught? The new
Japanese law schools, in part as a result of countless fact-finding
missions to U.S. law schools, are experimenting with several other
novelties borrowed from across the Pacific, including the Socratic
Method, clinical education, and transactional courses. Among these
methods, perhaps the most worrisome in Japan has been the Socratic
Method, for although many professors have experienced it in the
United States, they have little or no experience using it and are afraid
that their culturally inhibited students will not respond. I can put this
one to rest, I hope: Japanese students can and have learned
13. See MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, HEISEI 18NEN SHINSHIHO SHIKEN NO KEKKA [RESULTS OF THE




Socratically.1 4 I've used the method in classrooms in Japan with mixed
success, but it certainly can be done, and the LTRI, for all the
complaints about its strict orthodoxy, has been using it for years. Still,
it remains to be seen if these new schools will actually teach in the
"American" manner, or if, as John Haley puts it, they are "far more
apt to become examination preparatory schools-new, expensive,
university-run juku."'15 The low pass rates suggest that pressure on
universities to "teach the bar exam" will persist.
In the midst of these questions and criticisms, one issue has
remained largely unaddressed: will the new law schools meet the
demands of students? The discussion has been focused largely on
meeting the needs of society, not those of the learners. But what is it
that students want? Recent comparative survey data offer some
preliminary answers.' 6 In 2003 and 2004, Akira Fujimoto surveyed
436 law students in Japan and 243 in America. The cases aren't
exactly comparable-in Japan, respondents were first-year students
only, in America, respondents represented all years; in Japan, six
schools were surveyed, in America, only one (George Washington), and
so on. However, data are sparse, and this at least is a helpful
comparative start.
American and Japanese students were asked what job they
hoped to secure immediately after they finished their studies, and
what job they wished to hold ten years after that. The results, which
due to institutional differences don't pair up exactly, are shown in
Table 1.17 1 have omitted responses in categories that have a response
rate of less than five percent.
14. My colleague Carl Schneider agrees. See Carl E. Schneider, On American Legal
Education, 2 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL'Y J. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 76, 83-87 (2001).
15. John 0. Haley, Heisei Renewal or Heisei Transformation: Are Legal Reforms Really
Changing Japan?, 10 ZEITSCHRIFr FUR JAPANISCHES RECHT 5, 12 (2005).
16. Akira Fujimoto, Nichibei Ro-Suku-ru Gakusei no H~ishiki to Shokugyd Ishiki [The Legal
Consciousness and Employment Consciousness of American and Japanese Law School Students],
1297 JURISUTO 85 (2005).
17. Id. at 94.
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Table 1: Career Objectives of American and Japanese Law Students
After Graduation (%) 10 Years After
Graduation (%)
Career Objective Japan America Japan America
Judicial clerk N/A 21.3 N/A .8
Work in office that serves businesses 26.8 13.3 23.7 6.3
(small and large)
Work in office that serves individual 18.5 1.3 20.4 5.9
clients (Japan)/Individual private
practice (U.S.)
Intellectual property or other 8.9 4.6 7.9 6.3
specialized practice
Public interest work N/A 10 N/A 12.1
Government work N/A 7.1 N/A 16.7
International Organization N/A 11.7 N/A 8.4
International transactional practice 8.6 N/A 6.7 N/A
Prosecutor 7.7 7.1 5.0 2.1
Judge 7.4 N/A 7.2 N/A
In-house lawyer 5.0 6.3 3.4 13
Academic 3.6 N/A 5.0 N/A
Further graduate study N/A 5.0 N/A 1.7
Unknown 4.3 1.3 7.4 4.2
Other 2.2 10.8 3.1 22.2
The table reveals important differences between the two
systems concerning institutions, opportunities, and student
preferences. Consider first some responses that, while available in
America, were not tested in Japan because of institutional differences
that render the vocabulary meaningless. About a fifth of the U.S.
students surveyed sought clerkships after graduation, an opportunity
not available in Japan. American students similarly wanted to work
for (a) public interest firms, (b) the government, and (c) international
organizations. But in Japan, those options are, respectively, (a)
virtually non-existent, (b) performed predominantly by bureaucrats
with undergraduate legal training, not lawyers, and (c) far more
difficult to obtain because of language, locale, and other issues.
Now examine the opportunities that are available in Japan but
not in America. Japanese students were interested in "international
transactional practice," a category that really no longer exists in
America (all large firms have become international, and
"international" boutiques like Coudert Brothers are a thing of the
past). About one in twelve students in Japan wanted to be a judge
2007] 447
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immediately after graduation: an option not open to American
students immediately after graduation as it is in Japan.
Two other differences stand out. First, note the difference in
the percentage of students who want to become in-house lawyers after
ten years of practice (13.0% in the United States, 3.4% in Japan). This
difference surely is due in part to the demand from companies, as
many in Japan prefer to pay lower wages to non-lawyer workers with
undergraduate law degrees, and the practice of mid-career shifts to
firms is more difficult in Japan. But it might also suggest a reason
why students in Japan seek to become lawyers in the first place: to
achieve a level of autonomy that they think is otherwise unavailable
in Japan's relatively rigid corporate structure.
The other interesting difference is one that normally we might
gloss over as a catch-all category: "other." Japanese students seek jobs
that may be categorized as "other" at a much lower rate than in the
United States, especially after ten years (3.1% compared to 22.2%).
These preferences reflect a fundamental difference in legal education
in the two systems, and suggest an area for growth in Japan. In
Japan, options for lawyers remain limited. Options are so limited, in
fact, that most surveyed students simply could not think outside the
box to imagine them. In America, nearly a quarter of surveyed
students had some job in mind-politician? record producer? sports
agent? corporate management?-that did not fit the traditional
categories. Such jobs simply are not on the list of options for lawyers
in Japan.
In some sense, Japanese universities might simply be
responding to demand from students who don't want "other." Students
have fixed plans, and law schools cater to them and to the post-
graduation market in which they seek employment. In the abstract,
this seems like a good idea, but in Japan, a potential problem arises
from the yokonarabi style of competition. Yorkonarabi literally means
"to line up side by side," and although I'm wary of using Japanese
terms that tend to give the place an unnecessary mystique, there is no
good equivalent in English. In essence, the word refers to the practice
of copying one's rivals in an effort to hold on to one's market share,
with the goal of avoiding failure rather than a goal of achieving
success.
I'm not sure that the failure and closing of a law school is such
a bad thing, at least if the American experience can serve as a guide.
In the middle of the nineteenth century, when there were only nine
university-affiliated law schools in the country, law schools rose and
fell like the tides. The first law school at New York University opened
in 1838, only to close in 1839. Princeton failed to establish a law school
in 1825 and 1835, but succeeded in 1846. It lasted six years and
[Vol. 60:2:439448
MAKING LAWYERS (AND GANGSTERS)
produced six graduates. (It considered creating a law school once
again in 1891, but the school never reopened.) The University of
Alabama likewise authorized the formation of a law school in 1845. No
students enrolled, and the school closed in 1846.18
Perhaps the Japanese system as a whole might benefit from
market-induced failures like these. In fact, such failures might be just
around the corner. In part because of the projected low bar exam pass
rates due to high initial enrollment, law school applications in 2005
fell by approximately fifty percent. 19 The 2006 bar exam results
suggest further cause for worry. Graduates of fifty-eight law schools
took the exam. Three of those schools produced no passers. Only
seventeen schools had a passage rate of better than fifty percent.
Roughly one-third of graduates of even such prestigious schools as The
University of Tokyo and Kyoto University failed. 20 The future seems
shaky for many schools.
The relative prevalence of yokonarabi can be exaggerated; the
phenomenon of course exists in the United States as well, and Japan
has a few outliers, such as the Omiya Law School, which focuses on
training older students, often at night. But in Japan, where the
concept of copying one's rivals to avoid failure can be succinctly stated
with that one word, the practice is pervasive. The result in Japan is a
relatively uniform curriculum that shuns diversity and may tend to
discourage students from thinking in terms of "other." Without a
menu of choices-without a George Mason for the study of Law and
Economics, a Yale for academic wannabes, a Michigan for the
interdisciplinary study of the law, and other schools for a host of other
job opportunities-students are more likely to wind up in the same
boxes. Again, that's not so awful in the abstract, as someone will
always do the "other" jobs in any society. But it does mean that the
Japanese system of legal education might cause students to miss out
on some of the most interesting choices, opportunities, and different
ways of thinking about legal problems that flourish in the United
States.
On the other hand, students in Japan might more easily
accomplish their goals. The same survey asked students whether their
ideal jobs would match up with their predicted jobs. In every category,
a higher percentage of students in Japan predicted that such a match
18. ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL 8, 73 (1983).
19. See Alan Brender, Enrollment Plunges at Japan's American-Style Law Schools, CHRON.
HIGHER ED., Dec. 3, 2004, at 38.
20. See MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, HEISEI 18NEN SHINSHIHO SHIKEN HOKA DAIGAKUIN BETSU




would occur than did American students. 21 While we might all benefit
from lowered expectations, these numbers may also suggest that
Japanese lawyers are defining their mission a bit too narrowly.
III. GANGSTERS
In prior work with Curtis Milhaupt, I have examined some of
the many varied activities in which the Japanese mafia engages, in
addition to petty crime and extortion. 22 We highlighted and discussed
six specific service area categories, reproduced here in Table 2.
Table 2. Civil Activities by Japanese Organized Crime
Service Area Organized Crime Service Translation
Provider
Bankruptcy Seiriya Fixer
Debt Collection Toritateya/ Yonigeya Debt collector/"One who helps
another flee in the night"
Landlord-Tenant Issues Jiageya/Apaatoya Land fixer/Apartment fixer
Dispute Settlement Jidanya Settlement specialist
Shareholders' Rights S6kaiya General meeting operator
Financial Services Sarakin Loan shark
Surely it is only coincidental that at the same time the
Japanese bar concentrates predominantly on courtroom matters,
avoiding the "other," the Japanese mafia offers such basic services as
dispute settlement, especially in the area of out-of-court settlements of
automobile accidents. Surely it is mere happenstance that the
Japanese bar is relatively small, while the Japanese mafia is engaged
in landlord-tenant issues and financial services. Surely Figure 1,
which shows a correlation between an increase in the number of bar
exam passers (under the old system) and the number of organized
crime members, is coincidental as well: 23
21. Fujimoto, supra note 16, at 94.
22. MILHAUPT & WEST, supra note 1, at 145-78; see also Curtis J. Milhaupt & Mark D.
West, The Dark Side of Private Ordering: An Institutional and Empirical Analysis of Organized
Crime, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 41, 41-42 (2000).
23. Data on members from MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, HANZAI HAKUSHO [WHITE PAPER ON
CRIME], 1996-2005; data on bar passers from MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, SHIH6 SHIKEN DAINIJI
SHIKEN SHUTSUGANSHASU/GKAKU SHASU NADO NO SUII [CHANGES IN BAR EXAM APPLICATION
AND PASS RATES], available at http://www.moj.go.jp/.
j Vol. 60:2:439450
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Figure 1. Bar Exam Passers and Organized Crime Members, 1995-2004
Orgnized Crime











1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
--n- Organized Crime Members --- Bar Exam Passers
As Figure 1 shows, the number of persons admitted to the bar
has grown simultaneously with the number of persons admitted to the
ranks of organized crime (the gross size of the bar tracks similarly,
increasing from about 15,000 to 22,000). Of course, correlation does
not mean causation; many other factors could account for the
simultaneous increase. One possible explanation is that lawyers and
gangsters in Japan, because of the institutional difficulties of using
the Japanese legal system and the historical dearth of lawyers, serve a
similar clientele with similar problems.
Lawyers and organized crime members aren't perfect
substitutes. Rather, the market is divided into litigation services and
non-litigation services. When a societal need arises for these service
activities, a rising tide lifts all, or at least both, boats. In Japan, the
small number of service providers ensures a constant societal need.
Suppose, just suppose, that organized crime performs some of
the same roles that lawyers perform. Why is this a problem? As
Milhaupt and I pointed out, organized crime often backs up its
activities with violence, uses its civil activities to launder income
derived from more objectionable pursuits, and is antithetical to the
rule of law.24 If policymakers in Japan agree with the above
supposition and analysis, perhaps it is time to direct efforts at bar
reform that not only increases the raw size of the bar, but also
develops a more diverse body of practitioners. The number of
organized crime members suggest that such activities as automobile
accident settlement and landlord-tenant negotiation are profitable and
24. MILHAUPT & WEST, supra note 1, at 149.
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are able to sustain to some degree a body of workers roughly four
times the size of the organized bar (although the exact wages are
unclear for both camps). As the number of licensed practitioners with
the skills to perform such tasks increases, perhaps organized crime
will begin to dissipate.
What lessons can be learned from the yakuzas' success?
Perhaps none. Perhaps they are not so successful, and perhaps their
success is owed to threats of violence. But given that roughly one out
of seven Japanese view the yakuza as a "necessary evil,"25 perhaps it
is worth taking a look at four factors that may suggest how they came
into their prominent role despite their obvious illegality.
First, yakuza are not subject to governmental regulation. This
statement is a bit hyperbolic; they are of course subject to criminal
regulation, and since 1991 have been subject to a legal regime in
which rights can be constricted for "designated firms."26 But there are
no specifically applicable rules with a certainty of punishment to
determine how many yakuza can be admitted each year, how they may
advertise their services, or the kinds of businesses with which they
may partner. Unfettered by extensive regulation, curriculum
requirements, and detailed licensing rules, they prosper.
Second, yakuza have never defined their mission narrowly.
Instead of constricting their trade to one segment of the market, they
routinely change their services depending on demand, servicing clients
across a broad spectrum. If money gained by the extortion of
management secrets at shareholder meetings is down, yakuza can
always attempt to make further inroads in the market for bankruptcy
assistance. They think outside the box, they have diverse skills and a
diverse client base, and they adapt to changing times. In short, they
train for the "other."
Third, yakuza apparently aren't afraid of failure. Members
quit. Branches fold. They attempt risky projects that sometimes don't
pan out. And yet their numbers continue to grow.
Finally, yakuza offer their new recruits a variety of hands-on
training experiences. Young yakuza enter the fold because they show
potential in many areas-loyalty, a quick tongue, perhaps capacity for
violence and brutality or even the ability to wear a purple double-
breasted suit with style-yet they possess not a single test score.
There are no yakuza classrooms; rather, they learn day-in and day-out
from watching and mimicking their superiors, who constantly
25. Twelve Percent of Japanese Consider Mobsters a "Necessary Evil" AGENCE
FRANCE-PRESSE, Apr. 19, 1993.
26. See Bryokudan'in ni yoru futbna kbi no bbshi nado ni kansuru hbritsu [Anti-Organized
Crime Act], Law No. 77 of 1991.
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challenge them. Training builds on prior training. Young recruits
rotate through various activities in the firm, getting a taste of a wide
variety of activities.
In short, gangsters in Japan are innovative, diverse,
entrepreneurial, and proactive. Their training enables and encourages
them toward these qualities. They survive, and even flourish, despite
the illegality of their actions. Of course, there should be no connections
made between brutal gangsters and lawyers. But if one were to make
such a connection, perhaps the gangster training system might offer a
few hidden lessons for Japanese legal education.
CONCLUSION
Japan investigated a host of models from which to borrow when
it considered revamping its legal education system. Its apparent
borrowing from the United States is interesting in at least two
primary ways. First, the highlights of the new Japanese system,
including graduate legal education, Socratic teaching, and practical
training, are those characteristics of legal education that make legal
education in the United States the envy of the world. It remains to be
seen whether the selective mix chosen by Japan, which seems to leave
out such critical factors as diversity among institutions, will succeed.
Second, there is no guarantee that any part of the U.S. model is
transferable. When the U.S. model works, it seems to do so because it
matches the needs both of the market and of the students. Again, it
remains unclear whether such is the case in Japan, where the
demands of the market and of students appear to differ from those in
the United States.
In this Essay, I've suggested that there might be another model
with which the Japanese bar-and by extension, perhaps, the
American-has commonality, and from which it might learn as well.
But what an unsavory model those gangsters present. Surely
organized crime holds no lessons for the noble profession of law.
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